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Our model explains the lack of empirical evidence on the linkage between ﬁnan-
cial openness and macro volatility. If the empirical data of countries with diﬀerent
degree of ﬁnancial openness are pooled, we cannot estimate a signiﬁcant linear re-
lationship between ﬁnancial openness and macro volatility, because the underlying
relationship is non-monotonic.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E44, F34, F41
Keywords: Financial frictions, Financial Openness, Foreign borrowing, Macroe-
conomic volatility
∗We thank participants at ESEM 2006 and the 2006 annual conference of the Verein f¨ ur Socialpolitik.
†University of Bonn, Indiana University and CEPR. E-mail: vonhagen@uni-bonn.de
‡Corresponding author. University of Bonn. E-mail: hzhang@uni-bonn.de.
11 Introduction
According to neoclassical models, the economic beneﬁts of international capital ﬂows
are signiﬁcant. On the one hand, they provide developing economies with the means to
exploit promising investment opportunities; on the other hand, international investors
are able to earn higher returns and to reduce risk via international portfolio diversiﬁcation
(Stulz, 2005). In the past two decades, many countries have deregulated ﬁnancial markets
and reduced explicit barriers to foreign investors. As a result, global capital ﬂows have
achieved record highs relative to global income.
Countries diﬀer in the eﬃciency of their legal systems and market institutions. These
diﬀerences may aﬀect the return on foreign funds and thus the ex ante lending behavior
of foreign investors. Ceteris paribus, countries with better protection of foreign investors
attract more foreign funds. In this sense, institutional diﬀerences in the protections of
foreign investors can aﬀect the actual degree of ﬁnancial openness.
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) show that ﬁnancial opening should lower con-
sumption volatility while raising investment volatility, if most shocks are country-speciﬁc
and transitory. However, the empirical literature cannot provide statistically signiﬁcant
evidence on the relationship between ﬁnancial openness and macroeconomic volatility
(Razin and Rose, 1994). Using a panel dataset for OECD countries, Buch, Doepke,
and Pierdzioch (2005) ﬁnd that the implications of ﬁnancial openness for business cycle
volatility depend on the nature of the shocks and the link between macroeconomic policy,
ﬁnancial openness, and business cycle volatility varies over time. Developing economies
are more vulnerable to external shocks due to some structure features, e.g., limited diver-
siﬁcation of foreign trade,1 sudden reversal of capital ﬂows, the small country size. These
factors hamper the unbiased empirical estimation of the relationship between ﬁnancial
openness and macroeconomic volatility. Kose, Prasad, and Terrons (2003) provide a
comprehensive examination of changes in macroeconomic volatility in a large group of
industrial and developing economies over the period of 1960 − 1999. They ﬁnd that the
relative volatility of consumption has a non-linear relationship with ﬁnancial openness.
We develop a real dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy and
show that ﬁnancial openness has non-monotonic implications for macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Domestic ﬁnancial frictions may explain the lack of strong empirical evidences on the
signiﬁcant linear relationship between ﬁnancial openness and macroeconomic volatility.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. We consider a small open economy
with two types of domestic agents: entrepreneurs and households. They have production
projects using a domestic productive asset (land). Entrepreneurs and households should
not be understood literally: the former refers to the more productive agents, while the
1Kose (2002) shows in a dynamic small-open-economy model that terms of trade shocks can explain
a sizeable fraction of volatility.
2latter refers to the less productive agents.
A continuum of foreign investors provide funds at a constant interest rate lower than
the domestic interest rate. Both households and entrepreneurs prefer to borrow abroad.
Due to the debt enforcement problem, domestic agents use their productive assets as
collateral for foreign borrowing. As foreign investors are unfamiliar with the domestic
asset market and legal system, foreign borrowing is overcollateralized in the sense that
only a fraction of the expected value of the collateral assets is pledgable. We measure
ﬁnancial openness by the degree of collateralization.
By assumption, households are risk averse and the project of entrepreneurs is sub-
ject to idiosyncratic risk. Mutual funds emerge as ﬁnancial intermediaries. They collect
deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. Thus, in addition to foreign borrow-
ing, entrepreneurs also borrow from households via domestic mutual funds. If they could
credibly pledge their entire project outcomes to mutual funds, productive assets would
be all allocated into their project. Due to the moral hazard problem ` a la Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997), entrepreneurs can credibly pledge only a fraction of their project output
for domestic loans, i.e., they are subject to domestic ﬁnancial frictions. As a result, some
of the productive assets are ineﬃciently allocated into the household project.
As foreign investors are risk neutral and households are risk averse, the land-backed
foreign loan contract provides households with a safe post-repayment asset value, while
foreign investors bear all capital gains or losses on collateral assets. As foreign investors
and entrepreneurs are both risk neutral, they share capital gains or losses proportionally.
Consider a positive transitory shock to the foreign interest rate (FIR, henceforth). In
the model without domestic ﬁnancial frictions, entrepreneurs ﬁrst borrow abroad to the
limit against their land stock and then pledge the rest of their project value to mutual
funds. Land is all allocated into their projects. After the project completion, they ﬁrst
repay foreign investors and then transfer all project outcomes to mutual funds. The rise
in the degree of ﬁnancial openness has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, the domestic economy is more
exposed to FIR shocks; second, foreign investors bear a larger share of the capital gains
or losses related to collateral assets. The ﬁrst factor makes macro variables, e.g., output,
consumption, labor, domestic loans, and foreign trade, respond more strongly to FIR
shocks, while the second eﬀect is opposite. The non-monotonic wealth eﬀects induce
households to adjust their labor supply and macro variables have the hump-shaped
volatility patterns with respect to the degree of ﬁnancial openness. Similar patterns can
be obtained for the terms-of-trade (ToT, henceforth) shock and the productivity shocks.
In the model with domestic ﬁnancial frictions, entrepreneurs have to ﬁnance part of
their project investment using own funds. The standard loan contract between mutual
funds and entrepreneurs speciﬁes a ﬁxed repayment. On the one hand, entrepreneurial
net worth absorbs capital gains or losses on their land stock and household wealth is
less aﬀected by exogenous FIR shock; on the other hand, changes in entrepreneurial net
3worth due to capital gains or losses amplify endogenous asset reallocation. We can show
that the hump-shaped volatility patterns of macro variables are ﬂatter than in the model
without domestic ﬁnancial frictions.
In sum, the ﬁnancial contract with proportional risk-sharing between entrepreneurs
and foreign investors leads to the hump-shaped volatility patterns with respect to the
degree of ﬁnancial openness. In the presence of domestic ﬁnancial frictions, endogenous
asset reallocation results in ﬂatter volatility patterns. Our ﬁndings also hold with respect
to the productivity shock and the terms-of-trade shock.
In this sense, domestic ﬁnancial frictions and the foreign borrowing contract with
proportional risk-sharing may explain the empirical evidence that there is no signiﬁcant
linear relationship between ﬁnancial openness and macroeconomic volatility. The logic
is as follows. If we pool the empirical data of countries with diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial
openness, we might not be able to ﬁnd a clear relationship between ﬁnancial openness






The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 analyzes the model dynamics with respect to exogenous shocks. Section 4 summarizes
the main ﬁndings.
2 The Model
Consider a small, open, real economy. There is a domestic durable asset (land) with
a ﬁxed total supply, K. There are three perishable goods: an intermediate good, a
domestic ﬁnal good, and a foreign ﬁnal good. There are two types of domestic agents
with inﬁnite numbers: households and entrepreneurs, each of unit mass. There is a
continuum of foreign investors.
Households are risk averse and inﬁnitely lived. They have a safe backyard project to
produce intermediate goods using land as the only input; they are endowed with a unit of
labor that can be supplied to the production of domestic ﬁnal goods. Entrepreneurs are
risk neutral and each has a constant probability of death. In each period, entrepreneurs
of mass (1 − π) exit from the economy and new entrepreneurs of the same mass are
born, keeping the population size of entrepreneurs constant. The newcomers and the
surviving entrepreneurs supply their labor endowment to the production of domestic
ﬁnal goods.2 They have two projects for the production of intermediate goods using
both land and domestic ﬁnal goods as inputs. Both projects are subject to idiosyncratic
risk: projects have positive output in the case of success and there is no output in the
case of failure. Each entrepreneur can choose only one project and his project choice is
2Each entrepreneur must put a positive amount of own funds in the project in order to acquire loans.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) adopt the same approach.
4unobservable to others. It takes one period for households and entrepreneurs to complete
their projects. Land does not depreciate, while the input of domestic ﬁnal goods fully
depreciates during the project process. Intermediate goods are country-speciﬁc and only
used in the production of domestic ﬁnal goods. Thus, there is no foreign trade on
intermediate goods. Domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods are imperfect substitutes for the
consumption of domestic agents. There is no trade barrier for ﬁnal goods. For simplicity,
we denote st as the relative price of foreign ﬁnal goods in terms of domestic ﬁnal goods.
Thus, the terms of trade is 1
st for the small economy. Foreign investors are risk neutral
and lend foreign ﬁnal goods at the gross interest rate of r∗
t.
The economy is small enough that the terms of trade and the foreign interest rate


























¯ s and ¯ r∗ denote the non-stochastic steady state values of the terms of trade and
the foreign interest rate; ρs and ρ∗ denote their respective autocorrelation coeﬃcients.
Let Et denote the expectation operator based on information available in period t. The
ToT shock has mean zero, Ets
t+1 = 0, and the variance of σ2
s. ToT shocks can be
interpreted as changes in the foreign demand for domestic ﬁnal goods, i.e., preference
shocks. The FIR shock has mean zero, Et∗
t+1 = 0, and the variance of σ2
∗. Besides the
ToT shock and the FIR shock, there is an exogenous shock to the production of domestic
ﬁnal goods: the TFP shock. Aggregate shocks enter at the beginning of each period.
The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is expected to be more produc-
tive than the households’ projects. A continuum of mutual funds accept deposits from
households and provide loans to entrepreneurs. A deposit contract is a claim on the
ﬁnancial position of the mutual funds. The gross domestic interest rate rt is deﬁned as
the expected rate of return on mutual funds. We focus on one-period ﬁnancial contracts.
We choose the consumption composite of domestic agents as the numeraire. See
subsection 2.2 for the deﬁnition of consumption composite. Land is traded on the spot
market. Let vt and qt denote the prices of intermediate goods and land, respectively. Let
pt denote the price of domestic ﬁnal goods and the price of foreign ﬁnal goods is ptst.
Let wt and we
t denote the the wage rates of households and entrepreneurs, respectively.
2.1 Asset-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Our calibration guarantees that the foreign interest rate is always smaller than the do-
mestic interest rate around the steady state, r∗
t < rt. Thus, domestic agents prefer to
borrow abroad. A unit of the foreign ﬁnal good borrowed abroad has the domestic value
of ptst in period t and the required repayment is expected to be r∗
tEtpt+1st+1 in terms of








denote the eﬀective foreign interest rate in terms of domestic composite consumption.
Mutual funds have the exclusive technology to perfectly verify the project outcomes
of domestic agents and to liquidate the land stock of failed entrepreneurs at no dis-
count. As foreign investors do not have such veriﬁcation technology, domestic agents
cannot credibly pledge them their project output. However, they can borrow abroad
against their land stock. Normally, foreign investors are less familiar with the domestic
land market and would incur larger costs in liquidating collateral assets in the event of
debtors’ default than domestic mutual funds. Furthermore, the domestic legal system
is biased against foreign investors. Either way, foreign borrowing has to be overcollat-
eralized in the following sense. In period t, each unit of land is expected to have the




t Et(pt+1st+1) units of foreign ﬁnal goods, where θ ∈ (0,1] denotes the degree
of collateralization. (1 − θ) can be regarded as a premium that foreign investors would
have to pay to the domestic land buyers when they liquidate collateralized land.3 For
simplicity, we assume that θ is constant. θ can be aﬀected by many factors, e.g., the ef-
ﬁciency of the domestic legal system, the structure and development of domestic market
institutions, the tightness of ﬁnancial regulations, and etc. Thus, θ reﬂects the eﬀective
degree of foreign investor protection and ﬁnancial openness. Mutual funds do not have
the land stock to pledge to foreign investors as collateral. Thus, foreign investors do not
make deposits directly at mutual funds.
Given r
f
t < rt, households prefer to borrow cheap foreign funds and deposit them at
the mutual funds to take advantage of the interest rate diﬀerential. They borrow z
h,∗
t
units of foreign ﬁnal goods abroad against their land stock kt in period t. Their collateral





t Etpt+1st+1 = θEtqt+1kt. (4)
As households are risk averse and foreign investors are risk neutral, the optimal ﬁnancial
contract is a contract providing households with perfect insurance against unexpected
changes in the land price. Foreign investors get
qt+1kt−(1−θ)Etqt+1kt
pt+1st+1 units of foreign ﬁnal
goods as repayment and the land has a net value of (1 − θ)Etqt+1kt to households in















3This premium may vary along the business cycle and so does θ. See Iacoviello and Minetti (forth-
coming) for a detailed discussion.
6As shown in subsection 2.3, entrepreneurs diﬀer in their end-of-period wealth and are
indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Given r
f




i,t units of foreign ﬁnal goods before he turns to mutual funds for domestic





i,t Et(pt+1st+1) = θEtqt+1k
e
i,t. (6)
As the entrepreneur and foreign investors are risk neutral, the optimal ﬁnancial contract
is a contract sharing unexpected changes in the land price proportionally between them.
In period t + 1, foreign investors get
θqt+1ke
i,t
pt+1st+1 units of foreign ﬁnal goods as repayment
and the land has a net value of (1 − θ)qt+1ke
i,t to the entrepreneur. The ex post rate of















t+1 diﬀer from their expected value r∗
t due to unexpected changes in the prices
of land and foreign ﬁnal goods.
2.2 Households
















where β ∈ (0,1) and lt denote their time discount factor and endogenous labor supply,
respectively. The composite consumption of households is deﬁned as ct ≡ (cD,t)γ(cF,t)1−γ,
where cD,t and cF,t denote their consumption of domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods, respec-
tively. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). Households minimize their consumption
expenditures on two goods, which implies cD,t =
γct
pt and cF,t =
(1−γ)ct
ptst . The price of
domestic ﬁnal goods (foreign ﬁnal goods) is positively (negatively) related to the terms











Given that kt−1 units of land were invested in the household’s project in period
t−1, G(kt−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t and
household sales revenues amount to vtG(kt−1). The household’s project is decreasing-
return-to-scale, G0(k) > 0 and G00(k) < 0. Given that households deposited dt−1 at the
mutual funds in period t−1, the deposits have a return of ˜ rtdt−1 to households in period
t, where ˜ rt is the ex post rate of return on mutual funds in period t. Due to aggregate
7risk, ˜ rt could diﬀer from its expected value rt−1, an issue discussed in subsection 2.4. By
deﬁnition, rt = Et˜ rt+1. Given that households borrowed z
h,∗
t−1 units of foreign ﬁnal goods
from foreign investors against their land stock kt−1, the land stock has a safe net value
of (1 − θ)Et−1qtkt−1 to households. The household wage income is wtlt.
At the end of period t, households invest kt units of land in their projects, deposit dt,
borrow z
h,∗
t units of foreign ﬁnal goods, and consume ct. According to equation (4), for
each unit of land invested in their projects, households can borrow
θEtqt+1
r∗
t Et(pt+1st+1) units of














kt + ct + dt = (1 − θ)Et−1qtkt−1 + vtG(kt−1) + ˜ rtdt−1 + wtlt. (10)
The optimization over {ct,lt,dt,kt} gives the following equilibrium conditions,




















Each entrepreneur can choose one of the two projects: “Good” or “Bad” at the end of
each period and his project choice is irreversible. Both projects have the same Leontief
technology, i.e., a units of domestic ﬁnal goods are required for each unit of land invested
at the end of the period.4 At the beginning of the next period, the project produces R
units of intermediate goods per unit of the land invested, if the project succeeds; there
is no output if the project fails. The two projects provide the entrepreneur with safe,
nonpecuniary private beneﬁts during the project process.5 For convenience of aggrega-
tion, we assume that private beneﬁts are proportional to the amount of land invested.
Project “Good” (“Bad”) has a probability of success pG (pB) and provides entrepreneurs
with private beneﬁts bG (bB) per unit of land invested, where 0 < pB < pG < 1 and
bB > bG > 0. In other words, project “Good” is safer than projects “Bad”, but en-
trepreneurs get larger unit private beneﬁts from project “Bad”.
4In models with collateral constraints ` a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the leverage ratio of borrowers,
deﬁned as the ratio of total investment over own funds, is equal to the inverse of the gross interest rate,
which is too high and cannot be justiﬁed by the empirical data. We introduce the input of domestic
ﬁnal goods to reduce the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs to the reasonable level, e.g., 2.
5Our set-up resembles the principal-agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). According
to Hart (1995), private beneﬁts may refer to any nonpecuniary beneﬁts from running a project, e.g.,
large oﬃces or luxury business cars. Private beneﬁts are good for the project owners but may reduce
the success probability of projects. The trade-oﬀ between the success probability and private beneﬁts
is a short-cut to capture divergent objectives between project owners and outside ﬁnanciers.
8As shown below, entrepreneurs diﬀer in their end-of-period wealth and are indexed













where ˜ T is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG,bB} denotes private beneﬁts per
unit of the land invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. ce
i,t denotes his composite
consumption in period t and ke
i,t−1 denotes his land stock invested in period t − 1.
Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net
present value around the steady state,
Et









> qt + apt > Et










Therefore, project “Bad” should not be ﬁnanced. Project “Good” also has a larger























Therefore, if the project choice of entrepreneurs were perfectly observable, they could
borrow against all outcomes of project “Good” and land would be all allocated to them.
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur invests ke
i,t units of land and ake
i,t units of
domestic ﬁnal goods into either project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds,
ni,t, foreign loans, ptstz
e,∗





Thus, ni,t is the entrepreneur’s net worth in the project. The land-backed loan contract
between the entrepreneur and foreign investors has been speciﬁed in subsection 2.1. As
mutual funds cannot observe the project choice of the entrepreneur, the domestic loan
contract resembles the standard loan contract (Gale and Hellwig, 1985) and speciﬁes
a promise to repay Rm
t ke
i,t units of domestic composite consumption in period t + 1 if
the project succeeds. As the mutual funds can perfectly verify the project outcome, the
entrepreneurs always repays the promised amount if he is able to do so. If the project
fails, the entrepreneur hands over his land stock to mutual funds. After repaying the
amount owed by the entrepreneur to foreign investors, the mutual funds keep the rest
(1 − θ)qt+1ke
i,t. In order to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, mutual
funds must provide him with enough incentives,

p
GEt[Rvt+1 + (1 − θ)qt+1 − R
m







BEt[Rvt+1 + (1 − θ)qt+1 − R
m





The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he chooses
project “Good” (“Bad”). As the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the
9domestic interest rate, the entrepreneur prefers to borrow to the limit. The incentive
constraints are binding around the steady state and can be simpliﬁed to,
R
m
t = Et[Rvt+1 + (1 − θ)qt+1] −˜ b, where ˜ b ≡
bB − bG
pG − pB > 0. (14)
Each unit of the land invested in project “Good” in period t has an expected value
of Et(pGRvt+1 + qt+1) in period t + 1, in which Etθqt+1 is pledged to foreign investors
ﬁrst. Any promise to repay more than Rm
t ke
t to mutual funds in the case of success would
violate the incentive constraints. The entrepreneur can only pledge pGRm
t +(1−pG)Et(1−
θ)qt+1 per unit of the land invested to the mutual funds in period t. Et(pGRvt+1 + qt+1)
and Et[pG(Rvt+1 −˜ b) + qt+1] are the expected full unit value and the expected external
unit value of the land invested in project “Good”, respectively. The diﬀerence between
the two values, pG˜ b, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”
despite the lower private beneﬁts it promises, bG < bB.
The mutual funds are expected to break even in period t, rtzi,t = [pGRm
t + (1 −
pG)Et(1 − θ)qt+1]ke
i,t, which implies a credit constraint for the entrepreneur,
zi,t = Γtni,t, where Γt ≡
pG(REtvt+1−˜ b)+(1−θ)Etqt+1
rt









Γt is the domestic credit multiplier. As we are interested in the case where entrepreneurs
ﬁnance their projects using both own funds and external funds, our calibration guarantees
that the denominator in the deﬁnition of Γt is positive around the steady state; otherwise,
entrepreneurs would ﬁnance their projects using external funds only. As Γt is independent
of ni,t, domestic loans are proportional to the entrepreneur’s net worth.
Suppose that entrepreneurs ﬁnanced their project investment using foreign and do-
mestic loans in period t−1. At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of mass pG(1−π)
have successful projects and receive the signal of death; they repay their liabilities, sell
oﬀ their assets, consume all proceeds, and exit from the economy. Entrepreneurs of mass
(1−pG)(1−π) have failed projects and receive the signal of death; they hand over their
land stock to mutual funds and exit from the economy without consumption.
The newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs are endowed with a unit of labor and
they supply their labor endowment inelastically le
t = 1 to the production of domestic
ﬁnal goods. Their wage income is we
t. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur maximizes
his expected utility function, subject to his foreign borrowing constraints, as speciﬁed in
equation (6), his period-budget constraints, and domestic credit constraints,
(qt + apt)k
e
i,t − zi,t − ptstz
e,∗




where Ni,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. The newcomers and entrepreneurs who have
failed projects and survive to the next period are of mass (1−π)+(1−pG)π and their end-
of-period wealth is Ni,t = we
t; the surviving entrepreneurs with successful projects are
10of mass pGπ and their end-of-period wealth is Ni,t = we
t + [Rvt + (1 − θ)qt − Rm
t−1]ke
i,t−1.
As the marginal rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the foreign and domestic
interest rates, entrepreneurs invest all end-of-period wealth into their project, borrow to
the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death. It also justiﬁes the fact that
the newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs supply all of their labor endowment.
Due to linear technologies and preferences, the external funds and the project in-
vestment of entrepreneur i are proportional to his net worth. As a result, only the ﬁrst
moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the aggregate land
stock in the entrepreneur sector. Let lower-case letters without the index i denote per
capita variables of entrepreneurs. Per capita consumption ce
t, net worth nt, domestic
loans zt, foreign borrowing, z
e,∗
t , and land holding ke
t of entrepreneurs are
c
e
t = (1 − π)p





































t−1 and Zt−1 denote the aggregate land stock and domestic borrowing of en-
trepreneurs at the end of period t − 1, respectively. The aggregate expected break-even
condition of the mutual funds in period t − 1 is rt−1Zt−1 = [pGRm
t−1 + (1 − pG)(1 −
θ)Et−1qt]Ke
t−1. At the beginning of period t, the total repayment of entrepreneurs with
successful projects is pGRm
t−1Ke
t−1; entrepreneurs with failed projects hand over their
land stock (1 − pG)Ke
t−1 to the mutual funds. After repaying (1 − pG)θqtKe
t−1 to foreign
investors, the mutual funds keep the rest, (1 − pG)(1 − θ)qtKe
t−1.
The loan contract described in subsection 2.3 implicitly provides entrepreneurs with a
net unit return, with a positive expected value, pG˜ b > 0, in period t−1. For a successful
entrepreneur, the post-repayment return on a unit of land in period t is
Rvt + (1 − θ)qt − R
m
t−1 = ˜ b + R(vt − Et−1vt) + (1 − θ)(qt − Et−1qt).
As shown in section 3, three types of exogenous shocks result in unexpected changes in
the prices of land and intermediate goods in period t: qt 6= Et−1qt and vt 6= Et−1vt. The
expected net return to entrepreneurs, pG˜ bKe
t−1, absorbs most aggregate risk and the ex
11post rate of return on mutual funds is
˜ rt =
[pGRm






(1 − pG)(1 − θ)(qt − Et−1qt)




which diﬀers from its expected value rt−1 ≡ Et−1˜ rt due to unexpected changes in the
price of land. According to our calibration, 1 − pG = 0.01, the ex post rate of return on
mutual funds and deposits does not diﬀer much from its expected value. Furthermore,
as foreign investors also bear a fraction of capital gains or losses on the land stock of
failed entrepreneurs, the discrepancy between the ex post rate of return on deposits and
its expected value decreases in θ.
2.5 Domestic Final Goods Production and Foreign Trade










logAt = (1 − ρ
a)log ¯ A + ρ
a logAt−1 + 
a
t, (22)
where Mt, Lt, and Le
t denote aggregate inputs of intermediate goods, the households’
labor, and the entrepreneurs’ labor:6 The total factor productivity, At, is an AR(1) in
logarithms with the autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρa ∈ (0,1) and the non-stochastic steady
state value of ¯ A = 1. The TFP shock has mean zero, Eta
t+1 = 0, and the variance of σ2
a.
Factor prices are equal to their respective marginal products,
vtMt = αptYt, (23)


















t Et(pt+1st+1) = θEtqt+1K, (26)
Let Xt and It denote the exports in terms of domestic ﬁnal goods and the imports
in terms of foreign ﬁnal goods in period t, respectively. The interest payment of foreign
















where NXt denotes net exports in terms of foreign ﬁnal goods. In order to rules out
explosive bubbles in the land price, we assume lims→∞ Et(r
−s
t+sqt+s) = 0.
6As households and entrepreneurs are each of unit mass, the values of aggregate variables coincide
with their per capita values.
122.6 Market Equilibrium
Markets of intermediate goods, domestic ﬁnal goods, foreign ﬁnal goods, and land clear,










t + Xt, (30)
It =




K = kt + k
e
t. (32)











t } as well as the exogenous processes {At,st,r∗
t}
satisfying equations (1)-(3), (8), (11)- (32).
Let model MH refer to the model with unobservable project choices of entrepreneurs.
Foreign investors may not lend ex ante to domestic agents in countries with very bad
protection of foreign investors. In this case, the market equilibrium is almost same as
deﬁned above with θ = 0. The only exception is that households have to bear unexpected
changes in the land price and the ﬁrst item on the right hand side of their ﬂow-budget
constraints is qkkt−1 instead of Et−1qtkt−1 in equation (10),
qtkt + ct + dt = qtkt−1 + vtG
0(kt−1) + ˜ rtdt−1 + wtlt. (33)
2.7 Calibration
Taking the case of no foreign borrowing (θ = 0) as the reference point, we calibrate
the structure parameters here. We normalize the aggregate land stock, K = 1. The









and the marginal product, G0(kt) = (1 − kt)
λ, is decreasing in the households’ land
holding, where λ = 8. We set β = 0.975 and ¯ r∗ = 1.01 so that the annual domestic and
foreign interest rates are 10% and 4% in the non-stochastic steady state, respectively.
By convention, we set σ = 2 and ψ = −5. We set χ = 0.15 so as to keep l = 1
3 in the
case of θ = 0, i.e., households work eight hours a day in the production of domestic ﬁnal
goods. We set α = 0.36 and α0 = 0.000001 so that the household wage income accounts
for nearly 64% of aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods and the entrepreneur wage
income is negligible. By convention, we set the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of TFP at
ρa = 0.9. For simplicity, we set γ = 0.5 and ¯ s = 1 so that the prices of domestic and
foreign ﬁnal goods are same: p = ps = 0.5; thus, domestic agents consume the equal
13amounts of domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods in the steady state. Following Devereux,
Lane, and Xu (forthcoming), we set the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the terms of trade
and the foreign interest rate at ρs = 0.77 and ρ∗ = 0.46, respectively.
The surviving probability of entrepreneurs is set at π = 2
3, implying that one-third of
entrepreneurs have to exit from the economy each period. We normalize the land price
at unity: q = 1. In addition, the land stock of entrepreneurs is three times as much as
that of households, ke
K = 0.75.7 The leverage ratio of entrepreneurs is set at 2, implying
that they ﬁnance half of the their project investments using own funds, as in Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In order to satisfy the conditions mentioned above, we set
{R = 3085,˜ b = 1.74, = 411,a = 2.6}.
2.8 The Benchmark Case with Observable Project Choices
In order to show the role of domestic ﬁnancial frictions in aﬀecting macroeconomic
volatility, we describe here the model without domestic ﬁnancial frictions, i.e., mutual
funds can perfectly observe the project choices of entrepreneurs. In this case, land is
all invested into project “Good” of entrepreneurs, ke
t = K. Given r
f
t < rt, a rise in θ
only aﬀects the composition of the external funds of entrepreneurs. Given the binding
foreign credit constraints and the expected break-even condition of the mutual funds,
the project investment of entrepreneurs are fully ﬁnanced using external funds,










Et[pGRvt+1 + (1 − θ)qt+1]
rt
. (35)
Entrepreneurial net worth is not required and they consume their wage income we
t.
Suppose that households deposit dt−1 at the mutual funds in period t − 1. After the
project completion in period t, entrepreneurs repay their liabilities to foreign investors,
θqtK, and transfer the rest of the project outcomes to the mutual funds, [pGRvt + (1 −
θ)qt]K. The ex post rate of return on mutual funds is
˜ rt =





pGR(vt − Et−1vt) + (1 − θ)(qt − Et−1qt)
pGREt−1vt + (1 − θ)Et−1qt

, (36)
which diﬀers from its expected value rt−1 due to unexpected changes in the prices of
intermediate goods and land.
As shown in subsection 2.4, the entrepreneurs’ expected stake in the project out-
comes, pG˜ bke
t > 0, helps absorb most of aggregate risk in the model with domestic
ﬁnancial frictions. While, in the model without domestic ﬁnancial frictions, no incentive
is required to induce entrepreneurs to engage in project “Good”. Mutual funds only
diversify the idiosyncratic project risk of entrepreneurs but not aggregate risk. Given
that mutual funds do not accumulate reserves in our model, depositors have to bear
more aggregate risk than in the model with domestic ﬁnancial frictions.
7Our results are independent of the exact values of q and k
e
K .
14Aggregate input for and output of the production of intermediate goods are pro-
portional to the aggregate land stock, aK and M = pGRK. Essentially, the model
without domestic ﬁnancial frictions is equivalent to a standard RBC model with a repre-
sentative agent who has two production technologies: the linear technology to produce
intermediate goods using land K and domestic ﬁnal goods aK, and the Cobb-Douglas
technology to produce domestic ﬁnal goods. Aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods,
Yt = AtMαL
(1−α−α0)
t (Le)α0, depends on labor supply and total factor productivity.
Let model RBC denote the model without domestic ﬁnancial frictions. The mar-
ket equilibrium of model RBC is deﬁned as the set of three exogenous state variables
{At,st,r∗
t} and sixteen control variables {rt,ct,zt,lt,wt,Z∗
t ,vt,pt,qt,Yt,It,Xt,NXt} sat-
isfying equations (1)-(2), (8), (11)-(12), (22), (26), (28), (35), and (37)-(43).
rtzt = Et[p







GRKvt = αptYt, (39)
ltwt = (1 − α − α
0)ptYt, (40)
ptXt = pt(Yt − aK) − γ(ct + α
0ptYt), (41)




t ) = θqtK. (43)
3 Dynamic Analysis
This section analyzes how ﬁnancial openness can aﬀect macroeconomic volatility in the
small open economy with respect to FIR, TFP, and ToT shocks. We log-linearize the
equilibrium conditions at the non-stochastic steady state and approximate endogenous
variables to the ﬁrst order as the linear functions of the state variables in logarithms,
which we solve using the MATLAB codes provided by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
We analyze the model dynamics to exogenous shocks in period 0 under various degrees
of collateralization, given that models are in their respective non-stochastic steady states
before period 0.
3.1 Impulse Responses to FIR Shocks
In the case of θ = 0, there is no foreign borrowing and changes in the foreign interest rate
do not aﬀect the domestic economy. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of model RBC
(dashed line) and model MH (solid line) to a FIR shock in the case of θ = 0.5. DFG,
HH, and EN refer to domestic ﬁnal goods, households, and entrepreneurs, respectively.
Consider ﬁrst model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. A 1% positive FIR shock raises the
cost of foreign funds. Entrepreneurs have to reduce their foreign borrowing and their
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a FIR Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC
project investment. The land price declines. As the foreign interest rate is autocorrelated,
the period-1 land price is still below the steady state value and entrepreneurs have to





to the foreign borrowing contract, foreign investors bear 50% of capital losses. After
repaying foreign loans, entrepreneurs transfer the rest of their project outcomes to mutual
funds. Capital losses make the period-0 return on mutual funds below its expected value.
In order to oﬀset the negative wealth eﬀect, households increase their labor supply and
reduce consumption and deposits. Aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods rises and
the decline in household deposits raises the domestic interest rate.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. A 1% positive FIR shock depresses the
domestic demand for land and the land price declines in period 0. Although foreign
investors share half of capital losses with entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial net worth still
falls and so does their land stock. The decrease in the entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic
loans lowers the domestic interest rate, in contrast to the rise in the domestic interest
rate in model RBC. According to equation (10), the ﬁrst and the third components
16of household wealth are (almost) unaﬀected by the FIR shock. Households increase
their consumption and reduce their deposits and labor supply in period 0. As a result,
aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods declines instead of rises as in the case of model
RBC. Due to asset reallocation from entrepreneurs to households in period 0, aggregate
output of intermediate goods falls in period 1 and aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal
goods is further below its steady state value in period 1.
In sum, according to ﬁnancial contracts, the FIR shock aﬀects the household wealth
diﬀerently in models with and without domestic ﬁnancial frictions. The endogenous
supply of household labor driven by the wealth eﬀect is the only factor determining
aggregate output of ﬁnal goods in the model without domestic ﬁnancial frictions, while
the endogenous asset reallocation is the dominant driving force behind aggregate output
of ﬁnal goods in the model with domestic ﬁnancial frictions. As a result, aggregate
output responds diﬀerently in the two models.
Figure 2 shows the unconditional standard deviations of major endogenous variables
in model MH (solid line) and in model RBC (dashed line) normalized by that of FIR
shocks.8 The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0,1].
Consider the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model RBC.
As θ rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs use more foreign loans to substitute for domestic
loans in their project investment. Changes in the foreign interest rate have larger eﬀects
on the land demand of entrepreneurs and the land price responds more strongly to FIR
shocks. As long as θ < 0.6, domestic deposits still account for a signiﬁcant share of the
household wealth. The rise in θ results in larger capital gains or losses in the event of the
FIR shock and the ex post return on household deposits are aﬀected more. Households
then adjust their labor supply more strongly to oﬀset the wealth eﬀect. While, as
θ rises from 0.6 to 1, domestic deposits account for a smaller fraction of household
wealth, because entrepreneurs substitute foreign loans for domestic loans. Furthermore,
foreign investors bear a larger share of capital gains or losses and the ex post return on
households deposits vary less. Therefore, the volatility of the household labor supply
with respect to FIR shocks has a hump-shaped fashion. As the household labor is the
only dominant factor determining output here, major macroeconomic aggregates have
the similar hump-shaped volatility patterns.
Consider the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model MH.
As θ rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs and households ﬁnance their project investment
using more foreign funds. The net value of the land stock of entrepreneurs, pG(1−θ)qtke
t−1
is aﬀected by FIR shocks in a non-monotonic way as θ rises from 0 to 1 and so is
entrepreneurial net worth, pG[Rvt+(1−θ)qt−Rm
t−1]ke
t−1. As θ rises from 0 to 0.6, changes
in FIR have larger eﬀects on the project investment of entrepreneurs in the sense that
8Schmitt-Grohe (2005) shows that the unconditional standard deviations of endogenous variables are



























































Figure 2: Foreign Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility: FIR shocks
the land stock of entrepreneurs responds more strongly to a FIR shock. However, as θ
rises from 0.6 to 1, foreign investors bear a larger share of capital gains (losses) and thus
changes in the land price related to FIR shocks have smaller eﬀects on entrepreneurial net
worth and their land holding. Other variables have the similar hump-shaped volatility
patterns. In contrast to model RBC, household deposits have a rather safe return
due to the buﬀer eﬀect of entrepreneurial net worth in model MH. Endogenous asset
reallocation is the dominant factor determining output and the hump-shaped volatility
patterns are ﬂatter than in model RBC.
3.2 Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of model RBC in the cases of θ = 0 (dashed line)
and θ = 0.5 (solid line) to a TFP shock.
Consider ﬁrst model RBC in the case of international ﬁnancial autarky θ = 0. As
there is no endogenous state variables in model RBC, the dynamic structure is essen-
tially AR(1). The distinction between households and entrepreneurs does not matter for
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a TFP shock: Model RBC
aggregate allocation. A 1% positive TFP shock raises the marginal products of inter-
mediate goods and labor in period 0. The price of intermediate goods rises to clear the
market, given that aggregate output of intermediate goods is ﬁxed at M = pGRK. In
the meantime, the household wage rate rises, too. In addition, given the autocorrelation
in TFP, the marginal product of intermediate goods stays above its steady state value
in period 1 and so does the price of intermediate goods. It improves the expected unit
value of the land invested in the entrepreneurs’ projects in period 0, E0(pGRv1 + q1),
and entrepreneurs are able to demand more loans and expand their project investment.
Given the ﬁxed aggregate land stock, the price of land rises to clear the market. Thus,
the positive responses of the prices of land and intermediate goods to the TFP shock
improves the ex post rate of return on mutual funds in period 0. See equation (36).
The household wealth consists of their deposit return and wage income. The positive
TFP shock improves household wealth in period 0. As households prefer to smooth
consumption over time and optimize between consumption and labor, they reduce labor
supply in period 0 and make more deposits. The decline in household labor supply
19partially oﬀset the rise in TFP and thus the rise in aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal
goods is smaller than the rise in TFP. Note that in the model without domestic ﬁnancial
frictions, the supply eﬀect dominates in the credit market in the sense that the rise in
the households’ deposits reduces the domestic interest rate.
Entrepreneurs only consume their wage income, which is tiny and proportional to
aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods. Thus, household consumption, c0 = p0(Y0 −
aK) − we
0, rises in period 0. As the responses of imports replicate those of household
consumption and foreign trade must balance in the case of θ = 0, imports and exports
rises in the same magnitude as household consumption.
Consider model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. Its dynamic structure is similar as in
the case of θ = 0. Foreign investors and entrepreneurs jointly share ex post changes in
the land price (qt − Et−1qt). Due to leakage of capital gains on the entrepreneurs’ land
stock to foreign investors, a 1% positive TFP shock makes the ex post return on mutual
funds exceed its expected value to a smaller extent than in the case of θ = 0. The smaller
wealth eﬀect induces households to reduce their labor supply to a smaller extent and
thus, aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods rises more. The smaller wealth eﬀect also
induces households to raise their consumption and deposits to a smaller extent. Thus,
the domestic interest rate decline less than in the case of θ = 0. As entrepreneurs ﬁnance
their project investment using domestic and foreign funds and the foreign interest rate is
constant, the average cost of their external funds declines to a smaller extent. Thus, their
land demand rises less and so does the period-0 land price. As foreign investors beneﬁt
from capital gains, net exports rise to cover the unexpected increase in the interest
payment to foreign investors in period 0. As the responses of imports follow roughly
those of household consumption, exports rise, too. Major macroeconomic aggregates are
driven by the household wealth eﬀect and their labor-consumption decision.
Figure 4 shows the unconditional standard deviations of endogenous variables nor-
malized by that of the TFP shock σa in model RBC (dashed line) and in model MH
(solid line). The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0,1].
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model
RBC. As θ rises from 0 to 0.85, foreign investors bear an larger share of capital gains
(losses) in the case of positive (negative) TFP shocks. Thus, the diﬀerence between
the ex post repayment of entrepreneurs to the mutual funds and its expected value is
decreasing in θ. As the wealth eﬀect related to household deposit returns declines, the
negative responses of labor supply and the positive responses of household consumption
and deposits to TFP shocks are decreasing, too. Thus, aggregate output of domestic
ﬁnal goods responds more, while imports and the domestic interest rate respond less. As
the investment of domestic ﬁnal goods in the projects of entrepreneurs (aK) is constant,
the rise in the volatility of aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods and the decline in























































Figure 4: Foreign Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility: TFP shocks
The steady state value of domestic lending declines in θ, as entrepreneurs substitute
more foreign funds for domestic funds. The share of household deposits in household
wealth declines in θ, too. As long as θ < 0.85, household deposit returns still play a
dominant role. However, as θ > 0.85, the household wage income dominates in their
total wealth and changes in ex post deposit returns have smaller eﬀects on household
consumption-labor decision. For θ ∈ (0.85,1], the volatility patterns of output, con-
sumption, labor, and foreign trade are opposite to the case of θ ∈ (0,0.85].
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of model MH in the cases of θ = 0 (dashed
line) and θ = 0.5 (solid line) to a TFP shock.
Consider now model MH in the case of θ = 0. There are two endogenous state
variables, {ke
t,Rm
t }. Note that the distinction between entrepreneurs and households
matters for aggregate output in model MH. Given a 1% positive TFP shock, extra sales
revenues improve the post-repayment wealth of entrepreneurs, pG[R(v0 −E−1v0)+(q0 −
E−1q0) + ˜ b]ke
−1. Thus, entrepreneurs borrow more from the mutual funds and expand
their project investment. The land price rises to clear the market in period 0 and capital
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a TFP shock: Model MH
gains further improves entrepreneurial net worth. The land holding of entrepreneurs
rises and so does their demand for loans. Note that in model MH, the demand eﬀect
dominates in the credit market in the sense that the domestic interest rate rises.
As entrepreneurs bear most of the aggregate risk related to the TFP shock in model
MH, the diﬀerence between the ex post return on mutual funds and its expected value is
almost negligible. Capital gains and extra sales revenues still improve household wealth
by the amount of (q0 − E−1q0)k−1 + (v0 − E−1v0)G(k−1) > 0 in period 0. The rise in
the domestic interest rate induces households to increase their deposits, while the rise
in the land price induces households to reduce their land holding in period 0. As the
wealth eﬀect is weaker than in model RBC, the consumption-leisure substitution induces
households to raise their consumption and reduce labor supply to a smaller extent in
period 0. Thus, aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods rises to a larger extent. The
capital gains on the entrepreneurs’ land stock which are transferred to households in
model RBC are now captured by entrepreneurs. Thus, the weaker rise in household
wealth explains the responses of their labor supply and aggregate output.
22The deposits made in period 0 improve household wealth signiﬁcantly in period 1.
Households increase their period-1 consumption to an even larger extent than in period
0. They also increase period-1 deposits for the purpose of consumption smoothing.
The rise in the supply of deposits reduces the domestic interest rate. In the meantime,
the consumption-leisure substitution induces households to reduce their labor supply.
Due to the asset reallocation from households to entrepreneurs in period 0, aggregate
output of intermediate goods rises in period 1. Despite the decline in the household
labor supply, aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods rises to a larger extent in period
1 than in period 0 in model RBC. Domestic loan contracts specify a non-contingent
liabilities for successful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs bear unexpected price changes.
The enhanced land reallocation further ampliﬁes the eﬀect of a TFP shock on output.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. Domestic agents pledge half of the ex-
pected value of their land stock to foreign investors. In addition, entrepreneurs can pledge
part of the expected project value for domestic loans. Given a 1% positive TFP shock,
the entrepreneurs’ excess demand for land pushes up the land price. Due to the leakage
of capital gains to foreign investors, the additional improvement in entrepreneurial net
worth related to capital gains is smaller than in the case of θ = 0. Thus, the weaker rise
in the entrepreneurial net worth and their demand for land results in a smaller increase
in the land price. Similarly, the smaller rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic
loans leads to a smaller rise in the domestic interest rate.
As speciﬁed in the ﬁnancial contract between foreign investors and households, foreign
investors keep all of the capital gains on the land stock of households. According to
equation (10), the households’ wealth consists of the net value of their land stock, sales
revenues, deposit returns, and wage income. Without capital gains, household wealth
rises less than in the case of θ = 0. The smaller rise in the domestic interest rate
induces households to raise their deposits less. Thus, households increase consumption
and reduce labor supply to a larger extent. Aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods
rises to a smaller extent. Due to the smaller wealth eﬀect related to the deposit return
in period 1, households increase their period-1 consumption and deposits less. Note that
the rise in θ enhances the responses of household consumption and labor in period 0 but
weakens their responses in the following periods.
See ﬁgure 4 for the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model
MH. Due to the leakage of capital gains (losses) to foreign investors, the entrepreneurs’
demand for land and external funds responds less to TFP shocks as θ rises from 0 to 1.
There are two eﬀects. First, the land price becomes less volatile and so does the aggregate
foreign borrowing, which are similar as in model RBC; second, aggregate output of
intermediate goods responds less to TFP shocks, while aggregate output of intermediate
goods does not respond to the TFP shock in model RBC. Furthermore, household
consumption responds more in the shock period but less in the following periods. The
23overall eﬀects of θ on the volatility of household consumption are non-monotonic. Due
to the consumption-leisure substitution, household labor supply responds more strongly
to TFP shocks in the shock period and less in the following periods. The volatility
of household labor supply is also non-monotonic in θ. Altogether, aggregate output of
domestic ﬁnal goods becomes less volatile in θ, while aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal
goods becomes more volatile as θ rises from 0 to 0.7 in model RBC.
3.3 Impulse Responses to ToT Shocks
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of model RBC in the cases of θ = 0 (dashed line)
and θ = 0.5 (solid line) to a ToT shock.
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a ToT shock: Model RBC
Consider model RBC in the case of θ = 0. According to equations (8) and (9), a 1%
positive ToT shock raises the price of domestic ﬁnal goods and reduces the price of foreign
ﬁnal goods by 0.5% in period 0, respectively. The increase in the marginal products of
labor and intermediate goods pushes up the wage rate and the price of intermediate
goods. Thus, a positive ToT shock has similar eﬀects as a positive TFP shock. The
24positive wealth eﬀect induces households to increase consumption and deposits and to
reduce their labor supply in period 0. The domestic interest rate and aggregate output
of domestic ﬁnal goods decline. Entrepreneurs increase their demand for loans and land.
The rise in the land price further improves the ex post return on mutual funds and
enhances the wealth eﬀect on household decision on consumption, labor, and deposit.
Consider model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. Given a 1% positive ToT shock,
the wage rate and the price of intermediate goods rise, as in the case of θ = 0; in






by 0.115%, which is absent in the case of θ = 0. Despite the rise in foreign borrowing by
0.4%, foreign borrowing in terms of domestic composite consumption, p0s0Z∗
0, actually
declines by 0.1%. Thus, the land price responds less than in the case of θ = 0.
Household wealth consists of their deposit returns and the wage income. Due to
the rise in the prices of land and intermediate goods, the period-0 return on household
deposits exceeds its expected value. Thus, household consumption rises and so do the
period-0 imports. Due to the leakage of capital gains to foreign investors, the wealth
eﬀect is much smaller than in the case of θ = 0 and thus, households only reduce their
labor supply slightly. As a result, aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods also declines
slightly. Intuitively, in the case of θ = 0.5, foreign investors extract half of capital gains
and provide funds at a higher interest rate in terms of domestic consumption composite.
Thus, the output eﬀect of ToT shock is weakened by these two factors.
Figure 7 shows the unconditional standard deviations of major endogenous variables
in model MH (solid line) and in model RBC (dashed line) normalized by that of the
ToT shock. The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0,1].
Consider the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model RBC.
As θ rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs ﬁnance their project investment using more foreign
funds. Thus, the eﬀects of ToT shocks are partially oﬀset by the increasing leakage of
capital gains (losses) to foreign investors and changes in the eﬀective foreign interest
rate. Household consumption, labor, output, and the land price become less volatile
as θ rises from 0 to 0.55. As θ rises from 0.55 to 0.65, the volatility of household
consumption becomes further smaller. Due to the substitution between consumption
and leisure, household labor supply responds positively to the ToT shock and it becomes
increasingly volatile. Note that as θ exceeds 0.55, entrepreneurs have more foreign loans
than domestic loans, ptstZ∗
t > zt. Thus, the overall cost of external funds becomes
larger in the case of the positive ToT shock. Thus, entrepreneurs reduces their project
investment and the land price declines rather than rises in the case of θ ∈ [0,0.55). As
θ rises from 0.55 to 1, the land price becomes more volatile.
As θ rises from 0.65 to 1, more land is pledged to foreign investors. Mutual funds
suﬀer less from capital losses in the case of positive ToT shocks and so does household






























































Figure 7: Foreign Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility: ToT shocks
As long as θ ∈ (0.65,0.75), the wealth eﬀect dominates and households still reduce their
labor supply in period 0 in the case of positive ToT shocks. As θ rises from 0.75 to 1,
the consumption-leisure eﬀect dominates and households raise their labor supply more
strongly in the shock period. Thus, household labor supply becomes more volatile in θ.
Aggregate output has the similar volatility pattern as household labor supply.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses of model MH in the cases of θ = 0 (dashed
line) and θ = 0.5 (solid line) to a ToT shock.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0. Given a 1% positive ToT shock, as
entrepreneurs bear most of the aggregate uncertainty using their net worth, the ex post
rate of return on mutual funds does not rise as much as in model RBC. Due to the
weaker wealth eﬀect, the household labor supply declines to a smaller extent than in
model RBC and so does aggregate output.
The rise in the price of domestic ﬁnal goods also raises that of intermediate goods and
the sales revenues of entrepreneurs. Thus, entrepreneurs increase their demand for land
and the land price rises. Capital gains further improves entrepreneurial net worth. The
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a ToT shock: Model MH
extra demand of entrepreneurs for loans pushes up the domestic interest rate. Capital
gains also improve household wealth and thus, households increase their consumption.
Due to the rise in the period-0 deposits, the households’ wealth is above its steady
state value in period 1. They increase consumption and deposits further. The rise in the
supply of deposits reduces the domestic interest rate in period 1. Households also reduce
their labor supply. The asset reallocation from households to entrepreneurs in period
0 increases aggregate output of intermediate goods in period 1. Altogether, aggregate
output of domestic ﬁnal goods rises rather than declines in model RBC.
The distinction between households and entrepreneurs matters for macroeconomic
volatility. An improvement in the terms of trade (a decline in st) raises the prices of
domestic ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods. As domestic loans are written in terms of
composite consumption, the rise in the price of intermediate goods reduces the eﬀective
domestic liabilities of entrepreneurs with successful projects. Thus, the asset reallocation
in the case of a positive ToT shock actually results from debt inﬂation.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. Given a 1% positive ToT shock, the
27extra sales revenues improves entrepreneurial net worth. Due to debt inﬂation mentioned
above, entrepreneurs can expand their project investment. The rise in their land demand
pushes up the land price. As foreign investors share capital gains with entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurial net worth rises in a smaller magnitude than in the case of θ = 0 and so
does the land price and the domestic interest rate. Together with the rise in the eﬀective
foreign interest rate, the overall cost of external funds is higher for entrepreneurs than
in the non-stochastic steady state. Thus, the period-0 land stock of entrepreneurs rises
to a smaller extent than in the case of θ = 0.
As foreign investors bear all of the capital gains on the land stock of households,
household wealth does not increase as much as in the case of θ = 0. Households also
suﬀer from the rise in the eﬀective foreign interest rate in period 0 and thus they reduce
their land investment. As the domestic interest rate rises to a smaller extent than in the
case of θ = 0, households increase their deposits to a smaller extent. They also reduce
their labor supply and increase consumption to a larger extent than in the case of θ = 0.
Thus, aggregate output of domestic ﬁnal goods declines more in period 0.
See ﬁgure 7 for the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on macroeconomic volatility in model
MH. As foreign investors share capital gains (losses), changes in the eﬀective foreign
interest rate partially oﬀset the eﬀects of ToT shocks, in comparison with the case of
θ = 0. As θ rises from 0 to 0.45, household labor supply responds to ToT shocks more
in the shock period but less in the following periods. The overall volatility of household
labor supply declines in θ and so does the volatility of household consumption.
The rise in θ enables both households and entrepreneurs to borrow more abroad. On
the one hand, the net value of the household land holding in the non-stochastic steady
state, (1 − θ)Et−1qtkt−1, declines in θ; on the other hand, entrepreneurs borrow less
from the mutual funds and thus household deposits also decline in θ. The net value of
household land holding and household deposits are mainly unaﬀected by ToT shocks.
As θ exceeds 0.45, these two components in household wealth become less important.
Thus, households reduce their labor supply both in and after the shock periods to a
larger magnitude in the case of positive ToT shocks.
As θ rises from 0 to 1, foreign investors share a larger share of capital gains (losses)
with entrepreneurs in the case of positive (negative) ToT shocks. Thus, the land in-
vestment of entrepreneurs becomes less volatile in θ and so does aggregate output of
intermediate goods. As θ rises from 0 to 0.45, both the households labor supply and
asset reallocation become less volatile. Thus, aggregate output becomes less volatile in
θ. As θ rises from 0.45 to 1, the eﬀect of the household labor supply dominates so that
aggregate output becomes more volatile in θ.
284 Final Remarks
This paper shows how ﬁnancial openness can aﬀect macroeconomic volatility via foreign
borrowing in a small, open economy. We investigate the model dynamics with respect
to three types of exogenous shocks: the foreign-interest-rate shock, the productivity
shock, and the terms-of-trade shock, respectively. As ﬁnancial openness improves, the
normalized unconditional standard deviations of major macroeconomic aggregates dis-
play non-monotonic patterns with respect to the three shocks in the models with and
without domestic ﬁnancial frictions. Furthermore, their volatility patterns vary less in
the model with domestic ﬁnancial frictions than in the model without domestic ﬁnancial
frictions. If the empirical data of countries with diﬀerent degree of ﬁnancial openness
are pooled together, we might not be able to estimate a signiﬁcant linear relationship
between ﬁnancial openness and macroeconomic volatility, because the underlying rela-
tionship is rather ﬂat and non-monotonic. In this sense, our model may explain the lack
of empirical evidence on ﬁnancial openness and macro volatility.
We will confront our model with empirical data and check the robustness of such
non-monotonic volatility patterns.
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